Iran Talking Points on NIE Report prepared by the Jewish Council for Public Affairs
Assuming it is true that Iran suspended its covert nuclear military program in 2003, then the NIE is great news. It shows that international pressure and sanctions have worked, and this is an important lesson going forward. However, it would be incredibly naïve to claim that Iran is no longer a threat. Iran continues to defy the international community by enriching uranium and could restart the military track of its program at any time. Its president constantly makes ominous comments about the United States and Israel, and the regime maintains its support of terrorist organizations. For this reason, the international community must remain vigilant.
The NIE presents an opportunity to have a critical policy discussion free of the frequent stereotypes of warmongers vs. isolationists. It is important to have a real, honest, and probing debate about the genuine dangers to regional and international stability that Iran poses, and about the kinds of responses – carrots and sticks – that would be most effective in continuing our efforts to guarantee that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon, something their regime has sought for decades.
Given the history of past reports, it is important to take the latest NIE with caution. Intelligence assessments are an inexact science, and there is no consensus in the international community regarding the conclusions and accuracy of this report. In fact, the NIE establishes that if Iran wants to produce a bomb, it can do so. It merely concludes that nuclear weapons development might not be the primary objective at this stage in Iran’s nuclear program.
Prudence is necessary especially in light of the fact that Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency – the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog – considered that the American report showed less apprehension than his own agency’s evaluation. The IAEA has expressed concern about Iran’s lack of transparency in its uranium enrichment activities, and this is supported by the NIE, which reveals that Tehran continues to violate the international community’s calls to end the pursuit of the fuel cycle and the ability to make highly enriched uranium.
Nothing in the NIE conclusively illustrates that Iran’s nuclear program has been slowed down by a single day. The report focuses on the existence of a covert nuclear military program, not on the process of uranium enrichment. It suggests that Iran might have changed the sequence of its program, focusing on enrichment and temporarily postponing weapons development. However, focusing on producing the fissile material does not delay the project, especially because this is the harder, most important, and more time consuming part of the program. Making bombs is a much shorter process than uranium enrichment, and this could simply mean a shift in priorities.
To assume that Iran has changed its nuclear end goals simply because it has changed the order of production means is a dangerous venture that should not be accepted lightly and unquestionably. Moreover, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and Iran’s overall attitude – its defiance, continued secrecy, lack of transparency, and intensification of enrichment efforts in the past year – seem to be at odds with the implication that a change in processes implies a change in ultimate intentions. In fact, since world attention has been focused on the military track, a tactical Iranian concession made sense.
This gap between perceptions and reality must be addressed frankly. The NIE suggests that some achievements have indeed been accomplished, but these should not be interpreted as final. The report should serve as a vote of confidence to continue our efforts to guarantee that Iran does not achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Diplomatic pressure has clearly played a role in pushing Iran to modify its tactics and possibly rethink its strategic position. For this reason, divestment efforts and other types of sanctions should continue, as they are proving to be successful.