The Road Not To Be Taken: Assessing the Quartet Roadmap for Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking

Yesterday, the U.S. administration acquiesced to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's request to freeze its "road map" for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict until after the elections and the formation of a new government in Israel. Meanwhile, on Monday, American envoy David Satterfield met in Jerusalem with representatives of the Quartet for talks on finalization of the road map. Diplomatic sources said the updated version of the road map is different and far more detailed than the original draft. After hearing the reservations of the Israelis, the Palestinians and the other members of the Quartet, the Americans decided to tighten up security demands on the Palestinians and called for Israel to freeze settlement activity.

The following is an analysis of the original "Road Map" plan, a forty-three-point document titled "Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," which was reportedly handed to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon when he met with President Bush in October. The document, the product of intensive consultation between the four members of the Middle East peace process Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations), offers the most ambitious and detailed plan yet to restart Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking after more than two years of terror and violence. The entire text of the analysis can be found at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/.

Brief Outline of the Roadmap
The roadmap envisions three "phases" of activity: Transformation/Elections (October 2002-May 2003), Transition (June 2003-December 2003), and Statehood (2004-2005).

The first phase is itself broken into two stages: October-December 2002 and January-May 2003. During the first stage, it is envisioned that Palestinians prepare the legal basis for elections, draft a new constitution "for statehood," and begin retraining and rebuilding their security forces.

Palestinians are asked to take three steps toward Israel: issue an "unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere"; end all incitement; and "begin phased resumption of security cooperation as agreed in the Tenet work plan." At the same time, Israel is asked to facilitate Palestinian Authority official travel "without restriction"; transfer tax revenues; lift curfews and ease travel between Palestinian areas; dismantle settlement outposts erected since the start of the Sharon government; and end actions "that undermine trust," including attacks in civilian areas and deportations (what the roadmap calls "punitive measures").

Meanwhile, Arab states will "move decisively" to cut off funding of extremist groups. During the second stage, "as comprehensive security performance moves forward" and Palestinians meet "agreed judicial, administrative and economic benchmarks," it is envisioned that Israel "freeze all settlement activity," reopen closed Palestinian economic institutions in "East Jerusalem," and withdraw its forces progressively to pre-intifada positions, enabling Palestinian legislative elections to be held. At the close of this phase, Egypt and Jordan would return their ambassadors to Israel.

The second phase (Transition) starts after Palestinian elections and ends with the "possible creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders." During this phase, the Quartet would convene an "international conference" to launch negotiations on "the possibility" of such a state. Inside the territories, Palestinians would approve a new constitution and take important security measures. For its part, Israel is envisioned as completing, with Palestinians, negotiations for the "creation of a state with provisional borders," as well as taking unspecified "further action" on Jewish settlements "simultaneous" with the establishment of the Palestinian state (implying that the provisional borders would not be limited to the current boundaries of Areas A and B).

The third phase (Statehood) opens with a second "international conference" to endorse the agreement on Palestinian statehood with provisional borders and launch "final status negotiations" to reach a permanent settlement in 2005. Should that be attained, the roadmap envisions "Arab state acceptance of normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region."

Silence on Arafat
The roadmap makes no mention of Yasir Arafat or, as President George W. Bush called for, "new" Palestinian leadership. However, in numerous clauses in which it refers to actions by the Palestinian Authority, the roadmap effectively relies on Arafat's participation and support...

Inching Toward an Imposed Peace?
Although the roadmap reaffirms the concept of "negotiations between the parties," many of its proposals and the context in which they are presented collectively chip away at that very idea. The convening of two international conferences, the proposition that "judgments" of progress will be determined by the Quartet, and the creation of a "permanent" monitoring mechanism suggest the not-so-creeping internationalization of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. The implication of the detailed timeline offered within this roadmap is that the peacemaking engine can be expected to have gathered so much speed by 2004 that neither Israelis nor Palestinians will be in a position to stop the international locomotive pushing for a final agreement.

International Supervision
On the positive side, the roadmap repeatedly injects the idea of "performance-based" peacemaking, suggesting that actions, not timetables, will determine movement from one phase to another...On the one hand, the roadmap envisions progressively more extensive and intrusive monitoring and an ever-growing role in this bilateral conflict for international actors. This vision is exemplified by the astonishing proposal for a "permanent" mechanism, suggesting an international presence assessing Israeli and Palestinian behavior in perpetuity.

On the other hand, however, the roadmap has strange gaps built into the monitoring process. By the time Palestinians are supposed to end incitement, for example, no supervisory mechanism is yet in place to monitor compliance. Moreover, no outside role is envisioned for determining whether the Palestinian constitution comports with agreements with Israel or for overseeing the work of the proposed Palestinian election commission. The roadmap offers no view as to what constitutes compliance, nor does it prioritize which requirements are deal-breakers...

Sequencing
The roadmap also runs counter to the thrust of President Bush's "security first" approach (outlined in his June 24, 2002, speech), which envisions an end to terror and violence as a precondition to further diplomatic engagement. But whereas previous Quartet statements suggested simultaneity in calling for Israeli and Palestinian steps toward peacemaking, the sequencing in the roadmap actually suggests a series of substantive and irreversible Israeli steps in advance of complementary Palestinian steps. For example, in the stage that Palestinians are asked to "reiterate" (i.e., repeat their previous commitment regarding) Israel's right to exist and end incitement (though without monitoring), Israel is asked to accept numerous restrictions on its security operations in the territories, to transfer tax monies, and to dismantle settlement outposts...

Conclusion
As a springboard for new and intensive peacemaking efforts, the roadmap has numerous flaws. It is unclear, however, whether the document actually represents an evolving U.S. view toward pursuing the peace process after the coming confrontation with Iraq, or whether it has been tabled only as a temporary expedient to allay Arab and European concerns in advance of war in the Gulf. Even if the roadmap is only a device to deflect these concerns, such initiatives often have a way of taking on a life of their own. Breathing further life into this approach, without a top-to-bottom revision of both concept and detail, would render President Bush's June 24 approach stillborn.